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Nominal GNP: 
An Anchor for Monetary Policy? 
By George A. Kahn 
In  recent years,  the usefulness  of  monetary 
aggregates as targets for monetary  policy  has 
diminished. Financial market deregulation and the 
breakdown of the relationship between  money 
growth and economic activity have led the Federal 
Reserve to deemphasize the aggregates in the con- 
duct of monetary policy. Although the Federal 
Reserve continues to target and monitor various 
monetary  aggregates,  it  now  interprets  their 
behavior in light of information from a wide range 
of financial and economic variables. 
Because  the  focus  of  monetary  policy  has 
shifted from a small set of monetary aggregates 
to a wider range of variables, some analysts con- 
tend that monetary policy currently has no anchor. 
Without an anchor, it is argued, policymakers 
could drift under the influence of short-run distur- 
bances and, in the process, risk losing sight of 
long-run goals. With an anchor, however, policy- 
makers could tie themselves to a long-run goal 
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while potentially allowing themselves some slack 
to respond to short-run disturbances. If a mone- 
tary anchor could be found, it is argued, policy- 
makers  could  reduce  the  adverse  output  and 
inflation effects of short-run disturbances without 
sacrificing the goal of long-run price stability. 
Several possible anchors have been proposed 
for  monetary  policy.  Commodity  prices,  the 
foreign exchange  value  of  the dollar,  and  the 
spread between long-term and short-term interest 
rates  are  three  examples  that  have  received 
substantial  press  coverage  in  recent  months. 
Another proposed anchor for monetary policy that 
has circulated in academic writing for years, but 
has  received  less  attention  among  business 
economists and policymakers, is nominal GNP. 
With this anchor, policymakers would focus their 
attention directly on targets for nominal GNP. 
This article argues that nominal GNP targeting 
has some appeal as a policy anchor but that its 
use in monetary policy is not without drawbacks. 
The first section of the article reviews alter- 
native approaches to nominal GNP targeting and 
their rationale.  The second section explains the 
advantages and disadvantages of using nominal 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City GNP targets to help policymakers achieve price 
stability in the long run. The third section shows 
how policymakers might adjust policy in the short 
run in response to various economic disturbances. 
The last section presents evidence showing that 
economic performance might be improved under 
a monetary policy based on nominal GNP. 
Approaches and rationale 
for nominal GNP targeting 
Under nominal GNP targeting, policymakers 
try to achieve a particular path for nominal GNP. 
Achieving this path for nominal GNP would be 
accomplished in much the same way as policy- 
makers, in the past, have tried to achieve par- 
ticular paths for various monetary aggregates. 
Monetary  policy  instruments-variables  that 
policymakers closely control such as short-term 
interest rates and the availability of bank reserves 
-would  be adjusted to keep nominal GNP as 
close as possible to target. Acting in this way, 
policymakers would focus on nominal GNP, not 
as an ultimate goal variable of monetary policy, 
but as an intermediate target.' 
Nominal GNP is closely related to two impor- 
tant goal variables of monetary policy even though 
it  is  not  an  ultimate goal  variable itself.  The 
ultimate goal of  monetary policy is to achieve 
levels for prices and real output consistent with 
long-run price stability and sustainable economic 
growth2  By  definition, nominal GNP is the prod- 
uct of the price level and the level of real output. 
1 The concept of a target as used in this article corresponds to 
Benjamin  Friedman's  definition  of  an Intermediate  target  in 
"Targets, Instruments, and Indicators of Monetary Policy ," Jour- 
ml  of  Monetary Economics, Vol.  I,  No. 4, October 1975, p. 456. 
2 Other goals of  policy include full employment and external 
balance. This article, however, focuses on the goals of long-run 
price stability and sustainable economic growth. 
Consequently, nominal GNP growth is the sum 
of the inflation rate and the real growth rate. Thus, 
while  nominal  GNP  is  not  an  ultimate goal 
variable,  the price and  output  components of 
nominal GNP are goal variables. 
Approaches and procedures 
Two fundamental approaches have been sug- 
gested for a monetary policy based on nominal 
GNP. The first is to use nominal GNP in con- 
junction with targets for other economic or finan- 
cial variables. The second is to use targets for 
nominal GNP by  themselves. 
An example of the first approach is the use of 
nominal GNP targets in conjunction with money 
targets. Under this approach, policymakers would 
use nominal GNP targets as an initial step in deter- 
mining appropriate targets for monetary aggre- 
gates. The behavior of the monetary aggregates 
would then determine the short-run response of 
monetary policy to economic disturbances. This 
approach is basically that of  the West German 
Bundesbank. In determining the target for nomi- 
nal GNP, the Bundesbank makes an allowance 
for "unavoidable" inflation of 0-2 percent, which 
it then adds to the long-run growth rate of real 
GNP. The Bundesbank then uses this target for 
nominal GNP as a justification for its announced 
targets for a weighted-average monetary aggre- 
gate. 
This article examines the second approach to 
nominal GNP targeting-the one in which nomi- 
nal GNP is the sole target of monetary policy. 
Even  with  nominal  GNP  as  the  sole  target, 
3 This weighted average monetary aggregate is called "central 
bank money." For a further description of monetary policy in 
West Germany, see Stanley Fischer, "Monetary Policy and Per- 
formance  in  the U.S., Japan, and Europe,  1973-86,"  NBER 
Working  Paper  No.  2475,  National  Bureau  of  Economlc 
Research,  December  1987. 
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duct monetary policy. Some analysts have pro- 
posed targeting nominal GNP in much the same 
way as monetary aggregates have been targeted 
in  the past.4 Under such a procedure, policy- 
makers would set targets for nominal GNP that 
are consistent with the goals of monetary policy. 
Whenever the latest information indicates that 
nominal GNP is below target, policy would be 
eased by  reducing short-term interest rates or 
increasing the availability of reserves. Whenever 
nominal GNP is above target, policy would be 
tightened by raising short-term interest rates or 
decreasing the availability of  reserves. In this 
way, policymakers would try to keep nominal 
GNP close to its target. 
This  procedure  has  been  criticized on  two 
grounds. First, because GNP data are not collected 
fast enough to reflect current conditions, policy 
would  be  based  on "stale" information. For 
example, GNP estimates for a particular quarter 
are not released until the beginning of the next 
quarter. Furthermore, these estimates are prelirn- 
inary and subject to substantial revision. Policy 
actions based on this information, therefore, may 
be geared to an inaccurate view of last quarter's 
problems. Second, because it takes time for policy 
actions to affect the economy, a policy action 
designed to respond to "current" economic con- 
ditions may  not affect the economy for several 
quarters. As a result of this policy transmission 
lag, by the time a policy action takes effect, the 
action may  no longer be appropriate. 
As an alternative procedure, some analysts have 
proposed that policymakers focus on forecasts of 
nominal GNP.S Under this procedure, as in the 
previous one, a target would be set for nominal 
GNP that is consistent with the goals of monetary 
policy. However, policymakers would not wait 
for observed nominal GNP to diverge from target 
but would adjust policy whenever forecasts of 
nominal GNP six months to a year ahead indicated 
that nominal GNP would diverge from target. For 
example,  if  the  six-month-ahead  forecast  of 
nominal GNP were above the target that policy- 
makers had set, policy would be tightened. If, 
on the other hand, the six-month-ahead forecast 
were below target, policy would be eased. The 
advantage of  this procedure is that it looks for- 
ward. Because of  the policy transmission lag, 
policymakers adjust policy instruments to offset 
the  expected  future  effects  of  economic 
disturbances. 
Rationale 
Whether a policy based solely on prospective 
or actual nominal GNP should be adopted depends 
on how well it helps policymakers reach ultimate 
goals. Even if policymakers could precisely hit 
nominal  GNP  targets,  attaining  a  target  for 
nominal GNP does not necessarily imply good 
economic performance. Any particular level of 
nominal GNP is consistent with many combina- 
tions of  real output and the price level. Society 
clearly prefers some of  these combinations to 
others. For example, the best combination would 
be a real output level associated with full employ- 
ment and a price level associated with no infla- 
tion. Thus, policymakers ultimately care about 
how a given level of  nominal GNP is divided 
5  See, for example, Robert Gordon, "The Conduct of Domestic 
4 See, for example, Robert Hall, "Macroeconomic Policy under  Monetary Policy," in Albert Ando, Hidekazu Eguchi, Roger 
Structural  Change," Industrial  Change  and  Public  Policy,  Farmer, and Yoshio Suzuki, eds., Monetary Policy in Our Times, 
Federal  Reserve Bank  of Kansas City,  1983, pp.  102-03.  Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985, pp. 45-81. 
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nominal GNP itself. 
So why focus on nominal GNP? Why not focus 
directly on ultimate goal variables or on some 
other target ~ariable?~  Advocates of nominal GNP 
targeting give three main reasons. 
One reason is that monetary policy instruments 
may be more reliably related to nominal GNP than 
they are to other potential target or ultimate goal 
variables. For example, proponents of  nominal 
GNP targeting argue that while economists have 
a practical understanding of the determinants of 
nominal GNP, they do not understand what deter- 
mines  the division of  nominal  GNP  between 
prices and  ~utput.~  Thus,  they  claim,  policy- 
makers could come closer to consistently hitting 
a nominal GNP target than they could to hitting 
a price or output target. Furthermore, with the 
deregulation of financial markets, the relation- 
ship between policy instruments and other poten- 
tial targets-such as money and credit aggregates 
-has become less reliable. The relationship of 
these other  potential  targets  to  ultimate goal 
variables has also become less reliable. 
A second reason for focusing on nominal GNP 
is that nominal GNP targets may prevent policy- 
makers from exploiting the short-run tradeoff 
between  output  and  inflation.  According  to 
economic theory, policymakers can temporarily 
boost real output at the cost of permanently higher 
inflation. But policymakers should avoid such a 
myopic policy if the cost of permanently higher 
inflation is greater than the benefit of a temporary 
increase in real output. A nominal GNP target 
could  help  policymakers  avoid  this  kind  of 
myopia. If nominal GNP were kept on a constant 
growth target, it would be impossible for policy- 
makers to engineer a short-run increase in  real 
output by allowing inflation to rise.8 Such a policy 
would increase nominal GNP growth, causing it 
to deviate from target. Thus, targets for nominal 
GNP could force policymakers to reject policies 
that exploit the short-run output-inflation trade- 
off. 
A third, related reason for focusing on nominal 
GNP is that nominal GNP targets could be effec- 
tive in ensuring long-run price stability while still 
allowing policymakers some leeway in respond- 
ing  to  short-run economic disturbances.  This 
feature is perhaps the most compelling rationale 
for nominal GNP targeting. It arises from the 
inherent long-run and short-run relationships of 
nominal GNP to inflation and output growth. The 
next two sections explore in detail these long-run 
and short-run relationships. 
Nominal GNP targeting in the long run 
Because nominal GNP is not an ultimate goal, 
evaluating a monetary policy based on nominal 
GNP targets requires looking at the policy's effect 
8 This assumes that the target is fixed relative to potential real 
GNP, which would only be the case if starting at full employ- 
6 The use of such a target, it would seem, only ~nterjects  another  ment with no inflation. 
source of confusion between the instruments and ultimate goals 
of monetary policy, See, for example, ~~l~h  ~ry~~t,  control-  Thus, nominal GNP targets have been ~ro~osed  as a solution 
ling M~~~~,.  ne  Federal R~~~~~~  and Its  to the time-inconsistency problem. See, for example, Bennett 
D.c.:  ~~~~k~~~~  Institution, 1983, and  McCallum, "The Case for Rules in the Conduct of Monetary 
Instruments, and Indicators of Monetary Policy," p. 470.  Policy ," Weltwirtschafrliches Archiv, Vol. 123, No. 3, 1987, 
DD.  415-29. See also Anne Sibert and Stuart E. Weiner. "Main- 
7 See, for example, Bennett McCallum, "On Consequences and  kining Central Bank Credibility," Economic Review: Federal 
Criticisms of Monetary Targeting,"  Journal of  Money, Credit,  Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Vol. 73, No. 8, SeptemberlOcto- 
and Banking, Vol. 17, No. 4, Part 2, November 1985, p. 587.  ber  1988, pp. 3-15. 
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policy likely to contribute to long-run price stabil- 
ity and sustainable growth? This section discusses 
the long-run attributes of nominal GNP targeting, 
describes  how  policymakers  might  determine 
long-run targets, and identifies potential problems 
with setting long-run targets for nominal GNP. 
It is assumed that nominal GNP is the sole target 
of monetary policy and that nominal GNP fore- 
casts are used  in  short-run policymaking. The 
choice of long-run targets for nominal GNP does 
not depend, however, on whether short-run policy 
decisions are based on actual or prospective nom- 
inal GNP. 
Long-run characteristics of  a nominal 
GNP target 
One of the appealing features of nominal GNP 
as a target of monetary policy is the long-run rela- 
tionship  between  nominal  GNP  growth  and 
inflation. In the long run, factors unrelated  to 
monetary  policy determine the economy's  real 
growth rate. These nonmonetary factors, such as 
demographic and technological changes, affect 
growth  in  the  labor  force  and  productivity. 
Together, these factors generate a fairly constant 
long-run growth rate that is currently estimated 
to be around 2.5 percent annually in the United 
States. Thus, if policymakers can determine the 
rate of nominal GNP growth, they will, at the 
same time, determine the long-run inflation rate. 
Since nominal  GNP growth  is the sum of  the 
inflation rate and the growth rate of real output, 
the long-run inflation rate is the growth rate of 
nominal GNP minus the long-run growth rate of 
real output. With nominal GNP growth of 6 per- 
cent, for example, and a long-run real growth rate 
of 2.5 percent, the long-run inflation rate is 3.5 
percent. Thus, targeting nominal GNP is tanta- 
mount to targeting the long-run  inflation rate. 
To the extent policymakers can hit nominal 
GNP growth targets, the targets provide a sim- 
ple guide for achieving price stability over time. 
To lower the long-run inflation rate, policyrnakers 
must reduce, over time, the target for nominal 
GNP growth. For example, to reduce the infla- 
tion rate to zero in the long run requires reduc- 
ing nominal GNP growth to 2.5 percent-a rate 
just equal to the economy's long-run real growth 
rate.  Thus,  a  disinflationary  monetary  policy 
requires policymakers to reduce the growth rate 
of nominal GNP until it equals the economy's 
long-run real growth rate. 
Procedures to determine long-run targets 
Monetary policymaking with nominal GNP or 
any other target variable first requires setting a 
long-run target that is consistent with long-run 
goals. The choice of a long-run target for nominal 
GNP depends on the initial state of the economy. 
If the economy starts from a position where 
the long-run  inflation  rate  is zero, setting  an 
appropriate long-run target for nominal GNP is 
easy. Policymakers would simply set a path for 
nominal GNP that held the long-run price level 
constant. To do this, they would need only an 
estimate of the economy's long-run growth poten- 
tial.  The target  growth  rate of  nominal  GNP 
would then be set equal to this long-run growth 
rate. Because it would always be consistent with 
the  goals of  long-run  price  stability  and  sus- 
tainable  economic  growth,  the  target  would 
remain in effect as long as the long-run growth 
rate remained constant. 
If the economy starts from a position where the 
long-run  inflation  rate  is  positive,  setting  an 
appropriate long-run target for nominal GNP is 
more difficult. In this case, to reach the goal of 
long-run  price  stability,  policymakers  must 
choose a strategy to eliminate long-run inflation 
over time. Ultimately, nominal GNP growth will 
have to decline to a rate that equals the economy's 
long-run growth  rate. Only  then  will long-run 
inflation be eliminated. Getting there, however, 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City can be costly to the economy. 
Reducing nominal GNP growth requires a con- 
tractionary policy  that, in the short run, could 
decrease output growth. The severity of any tem- 
porary decline in real growth depends on how 
rapidly public expectations of inflation change. 
If  expectations  adjust  slowly,  for  example, 
workers will be reluctant to accept a slower rate 
of increase in their wages. Real wages will rise, 
and output will fall. In this case, a fall in nominal 
GNP growth will generate a relatively small initial 
decrease in inflation along with a relatively large 
decrease in real output growth. This reduced rate 
of output growth could persist for a long time. 
The output loss associated with disinflation may 
be reduced by a gradualist approach. Because the 
public adjusts its inflation expectations slowly, 
nominal GNP targets that are set with the inten- 
tion of gradually eliminating inflation over time 
may reduce the cost of disinflation. One approach 
would be to announce a multiyear plan for reduc- 
ing nominal GNP growth. Under this approach, 
targets would be set for nominal GNP that over 
the course of several years reduced nominal GNP 
growth to a rate equal to the economy's long-run 
growth potential. 
This approach corresponds to the current policy 
of gradually reducing money growth over time. 
An important difference, however, is that multi- 
year  targets would  be announced for nominal 
GNP  rather  than  one-year  targets  for  money 
growth. Because policymakers would not have 
to compensate for a potentially unstable relation- 
ship between economic activity and the money 
supply in setting long-run targets, establishing a 
multiyear strategy for eliminating long-run infla- 
tion might be more straightforward under nominal 
GNP targets. Furthermore, policymakers might 
be more willing to commit themselves to a multi- 
year plan if they did not have to anticipate changes 
in  the  relationship  of  the  money  supply  to 
economic activity. Such a plan for nominal GNP 
might require five or more years to achieve price 
stability. 
One possible benefit of a gradualist program 
is that it gives the public an opportunity to adjust 
expectations.  If  after some experience with a 
multiyear nominal GNP target, the public begins 
to accept policymakers' commitment to long-run 
targets,  public  expectations of  inflation  might 
adjust downward more rapidly, and disinflation 
could be carried out with a lower output cost. In 
fact, this expectation effect could be built into a 
long-run target. Policymakers could set a target 
that, at first, slowly reduced the growth rate of 
nominal GNP and that later, as credibility was 
established, more rapidly reduced the growth rate 
of nominal GNP. 
Multiyear targets for nominal GNP could be 
reviewed each year. Targets would have to be 
adjusted if estimates of the potential growth rate 
of real output changed.1° Targets could also be 
adjusted as new estimates of the short-run infla- 
tion-output tradeoff became available. For exam- 
ple,  if  the  output  loss  from a  disinflationary 
program was more severe than originally esti-," 
10 Once a year, policymakers could re-estimate the economy's 
long-run growth potential. The estimate of the long-run growth 
rate could change as estimation techniques improved, new data 
became available,  and such economic fundamentals as demo- 
graphics  and  technology  changed.  If  the  estimated  long-run 
growth rate changed, the long-run target for normnal GNP growth 
would be adjusted. This annual adjustment corresponds to the 
annual setting of targets for the money and credit aggregates that 
occurs every February under current monetary policy procedures. 
Adjustments to long-run growth targets resulting from  new 
estimates of the potential growth rate may require rebaslng the 
target. If new estimates imply that the potential growth rate will 
change in the future, due perhaps to prospective demographic 
or technological changes, the new growth target should be based 
at the current target level of nominal GNP for the year in which 
the change is expected to occur. If, however,  historical poten- 
tial growth rates were misestimated and, as a result, nominal 
GNP diverged from target, a new base should be set for nominal 
GNP growth. The new base should equal the actual current level 
of nominal GNP. Thus, base drift is permitted only when nominal 
GNP diverges from target because of mistaken estimates of past 
potential growth  rates. 
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process  of  reducing  nominal  GNP  growth." 
Policymakers would have to consider, however, 
the effect that such a change would have on the 
credibility of  nominal GNP  targets.  Frequent 
adjustment of  long-run targets might delay the 
adjustment of expectations and prolong the disin- 
flationary process.  l2 
Potential problems with multiyear targets 
The concept of  setting  multiyear targets for 
nominal GNP is controversial. For a number of 
reasons, policymakers may be reluctant to adopt 
the concept for monetary policy.13 
First,  people  might  misinterpret announced 
targets for nominal GNP. They might think tar- 
gets imply that monetary policymakers somehow 
control aggregate demand or production in the 
economy.  While  monetary  policy  influences 
aggregate demand, other factors beyond the con- 
trol of monetary policymakers are clearly impor- 
tant. Aggregate demand is influenced not just by 
monetary policy but also by fiscal policy and the 
actions of millions of businesses and individuals. 
Furthermore, policymakers have little or no con- 
trol over supply factors such as the price of oil. 
11  If targets were set on the basis of poor estimates of the short- 
run  inflation-utput  tradeoff, rebasing could be necessary. Rebas- 
ing might also be necessary if revisions to nominal GNP statistics 
changed the base over which targets were set. Such revisions 
occur frequently and sometimes significantly change historical 
estimates of nominal GNP. 
12 This would especially be true  if rebasing were involved. 
13 For the perspective of a former Federal Reserve official, see 
Stephen Axilrod, "Comments,"  Monerary Policy in Our Times, 
Cambridge: MIT Press,  1985, pp.  123-26. For a response to 
some of the arguments made against nominal GNP targeting, 
see Stephen McNees, "Prospective Nominal GNP Targeting: 
An Alternative Framework for Monetary Policy," New England 
Economic  Review,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston, 
SeptemberIOctober 1987, pp. 3-9. 
As a result, monetary policymakers must take 
these  other  factors  as  constraints  on  their 
policymaking, not as variables they directly con- 
trol. If  nominal GNP targets lead people to believe 
that monetary policy alone determines aggregate 
economic activity, then policymakers might be 
held responsible for achieving goals beyond their 
control. 
Second, along these same lines, setting targets 
for nominal GNP is just one step away from set- 
ting targets for real output and prices. If people 
incorrectly view control over nominal GNP as 
tantamount to control over real output, policy- 
makers may  be pressured into stimulating real 
output. This may be especially problematic dur- 
ing a recession when public attention is focused 
on unemployment. The consequences of targeting 
real  GNP,  however,  are  potentially  serious. 
Targeting too high a level of output can result 
in escalating inflation rates. By being held respon- 
sible  for  short-run  real  output,  policymakers 
might lose sight of long-run goals such as price 
stability. 
Finally, multiyear nominal GNP targets may 
not significantly reduce the cost of  disinflation 
because targets may have little credibility beyond 
the first year or two. To the extent that businesses 
and workers discount the future, they may assign 
little weight to policymakers' intentions five years 
down the road.  Instead, people may  be much 
more interested in policy for the short run. In a 
recession,  they  will  only  want  to  know  the 
immediate plans of policymakers for stimulating 
a recovery, and in an inflationary boom, they will 
only want to know plans for dealing with the near- 
term inflation problem. Likewise, in response to 
a supply disruption such as an oil embargo, they 
will only want to know plans for countering near- 
term inflation or output effects. As a result, the 
public may focus only on short-run objectives, 
ignoring the central bank's strategy for long-run 
price stability. Public expectations of long-run 
inflation, therefore,  may  not change to reflect 
Federal Rese~e  Bank of  Kansas City 
i policymakers'  intentions.  If  not,  the  cost  of 
disinflation  could  remain  high  despite  the 
announcement of  multiyear targets for nominal 
GNP. 
Nominal GNP targeting in the short run 
Setting long-run targets for nominal GNP is 
relatively simple compared to the complexities 
of dealing with short-run economic disturbances. 
One of the complexities associated with short-run 
policy  decisions is  the  lag  between  the  time 
policymakers change policy instruments and the 
time  those  changes  affect  the  economy.  As 
previously indicated, this policy transmission lag 
creates a need for economic forecasts. 
This section describes how  short-run distur- 
bances affect economic performance and  how 
policymakers might respond to these disturbances 
using nominal  GNP  forecasts and  a  long-run 
nominal GNP target. The section also discusses 
potential problems with the approach. Because 
the issues involved are complex, the discussion 
begins  with  a  description  of  the  short-run 
characteristics of a nominal GNP target under the 
unrealistic assumptions that  policymakers can 
predict economic disturbances before they occur 
and that policy actions take effect immediately. 
Later, when short-run policy procedures are con- 
sidered, these assumptions are relaxed. 
Short-run characteristics of 
a nominal GNP target 
Short-run  economic  disturbances  take  the 
economy off its long-run growth path, causing 
fluctuations in prices and real output. As long as 
the price and output effects do not cancel each 
other out, nominal GNP will also fluctuate in 
response to short-run disturbances. A monetary 
policy  with  nominal  GNP targets counteracts 
these fluctuations in nominal GNP. 
The two broad categories of economic distur- 
bances-demand disturbances and supply distur- 
bances-have different implications for nominal 
GNP, output, and prices.  While a nominal GNP 
target leads policymakers to offset completely the 
price and output effects of demand disturbances, 
it leads policymakers to accept at least part of the 
price and output effects of supply disturbances. 
EfSects of demand disturbances. Demand dis- 
turbances include changes in  business or con- 
sumer confidence, changes in government spend- 
ing  or  taxes,  and  changes  in  net  exports. 
Examples of positive demand disturbances are a 
cut in  taxes or an increase in confidence. Such 
positive disturbances cause both prices and real 
output to rise in the short run. As a result, nominal 
GNP rises. Examples of negative demand distur- 
bances are an increase in taxes or a decrease in 
confidence. Such negative disturbances cause both 
prices and real output to fall in the short run. As 
a result, nominal GNP falls. 
Under a nominal GNP target,  policymakers 
would tighten monetary policy in response to a 
positive demand disturbance and ease policy in 
response to a negative demand disturbance. To 
tighten policy, short-term interest rates would be 
raised by restricting the availability of  reserves 
to the banking system. To ease policy, short-term 
interest rates would be lowered by increasing the 
availability of  reserves. Either way, monetary 
policy would be adjusted to offset the tendency 
for nominal GNP to deviate from target. By keep 
ing nominal GNP on a fixed target in the face 
of  demand  disturbances,  policymakers would 
keep both prices and output at their original levels. 
The most obvious recent example of a demand 
disturbance was the reduction in business and con- 
sumer confidence caused by  the October 1987 
l4  For a formal analysis of supply and demand shocks under 
a monetary policy based on nominal GNP targets, see Charles 
Bean, "Targeting Nominal Income: An Appraisal,"  Economic 
Journal, Vol. 93, No. 372, December 1983, pp. 806-19. 
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might  be  expected  to  lower  consumer  and 
business spending and, therefore, nominal GNP. 
Just as occurred under current  monetary pro- 
cedures,  policy  would  be eased  under a fixed 
target for nominal GNP. If  nominal GNP were 
kept on target, the price and output effects of the 
stock market decline would be completely off- 
set.  Thus,  the  outcome  under  nominal  GNP 
targeting would probably not have differed much 
from what actually occurred. 
Effects of supply disturbances. Supply distur- 
bances include changes in inflation expectations 
and  input  costs.  Examples  of  positive  supply 
disturbances are a lowering of inflation expecta- 
tions or a reduction in food or oil prices. Such 
positive disturbances lower prices and raise real 
output in the short run. Examples of  negative 
supply  disturbances are increases in  inflation 
expectations or increases in food or oil prices. 
Such negative disturbances raise prices and lower 
real output in the short run. Because the price and 
output  effects  of  supply  disturbances  go  in 
opposite directions, their overall effect on nominal 
GNP could be either positive or negative. 
Under a nominal GNP target, the response of 
policymakers to a supply disturbanc'e depends on 
whether nominal GNP rises or falls. If nominal 
GNP rises, policy would be tightened. If nominal 
GNP falls, policy would be eased. Either way, 
a nominal GNP target could not prevent prices 
and output from fluctuating. If policymakers held 
nominal GNP constant in the face of a positive 
supply disturbance, for example, the resulting 
percentage decrease in prices would necessarily 
equal the percentage increase in output. Likewise, 
holding nominal GNP constant in  the face of a 
negative supply disturbance would cause prices 
to rise and  output to fall by  equal percentage 
amounts.  l5 Thus, a monetary policy with nominal 
15 Strictly spealang, the percentage increase (decrease) in prices 
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GNP targets could not prevent price and output 
fluctuations in the face of  supply disturbances. 
However, such a policy would divide the impact 
of a supply disturbance equally between prices 
and output. This equal division is an appealing 
feature of nominal GNP targeting to the extent 
society views stability of  prices and output as 
equally desirable. 
The most obvious recent example of a supply 
disturbance was the increase in food prices caused 
by this year's drought. This supply disturbance 
resulted in a reduction in agricultural output and 
an increase in its price. Because agriculture is a 
relatively small proportion of aggregate produc- 
tion, however, overall real output was depressed 
only  slightly, and  the overall price level  was 
raised only slightly. Thus, the price and output 
effects were small and offsetting. Assuming the 
price effects were a little bigger than the output 
effects, though, implies that nominal GNP rose 
slightly. Therefore, the recent drought might call 
for a slight tightening of monetary policy under 
a fixed nominal GNP target. 
Conclusions.  In  summary,  the  response  of 
policymakers to short-run disturbances under a 
nominal GNP target depends on the nature of the 
disturbance. Demand disturbances, which cause 
prices and output to move in the same direction, 
are completely offset. Clearly, this response is 
an appealing feature of  nominal GNP targets. 
Supply disturbances, on the other hand, cause 
only approximately equals the percentage decrease (increase) in 
output. Let  Y represent nominal GNP, P represent the price level, 
and Q represent real output. Then  Y = PQ.  With lower case 
letters representing rates of change, 
Y=P+9+P4. 
If nominal GNP is held constant, then y must equal 0.  Therefore, 
P  = -4 + P4. 
Since pq is relatively small, however,  p  is approximately equal 
to  -4. 
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By maintaining constant nominal GNP in the face 
of a supply disturbance, policymakers split the 
burden of the disturbance between prices and out- 
put. For example, in the case of an adverse supply 
disturbance,  the percentage increase in  prices 
equals the percentage decrease in real output. As 
long as society equally values price and output 
stability, this response to supply disturbances is 
another appealing feature of nominal GNP targets. 
Short-run policy procedures 
As discussed above, supply and demand dis- 
turbances potentially take the economy off course 
in the short run. The goal of short-run monetary 
policy is to minimize the adverse effects of these 
disturbances, without sacrificing long-run goals. 
Monetary  policy  in  the  short  run  under  a 
nominal GNP target involves adjusting policy 
instruments to offset any tendency for nominal 
GNP to diverge from target. Because of lags in 
the transmission of policy actions to the economy, 
however, policymakers must focus on nominal 
GNP growth forecasts rather than on the latest 
nominal GNP growth statistic. For example, if 
policymakers raise short-term interest rates today, 
the effect of higher rates might not be felt for six 
or more months. Thus, the actions policymakers 
take today must be based on their expectations 
about economic conditions six or more months 
into the future. 
With a policy transmission lag, policymakers 
must determine what currently available infor- 
mation implies about the state of the economy two 
or more quarters into the future. Furthermore, 
with data collection lags, this current informa- 
tion may reflect last quarter's economy and may 
be subject to substantial revision. If policymakers 
merely react to incoming data, real output fluc- 
tuations might be exacerbated. For example, if 
policyrnakers base instrument adjustments on cur- 
rent nominal GNP growth, they might tend to 
tighten  policy  near cyclical peaks and  loosen 
policy near troughs. Such policy actions might 
become effective too late and, as a result, exacer- 
bate cyclical fluctuations. 
Many economic disturbances are impossible to 
predict and, therefore, to offset completely. How- 
ever,  as  soon  as  a  disturbance  is  observed, 
forecasts can be made about its effect on future 
nominal GNP. These effects can potentially be 
offset. Thus, while it  would  be impossible to 
precisely control nominal GNP in the short run, 
it might be possible to keep nominal GNP within 
a relatively narrow target range. 
In  making  nominal  GNP  forecasts,  policy- 
makers need models of how the economy func- 
tions. These models could take many forms. They 
might be large econometric models that incor- 
porate economic theory, judgment, and a lot of 
information.  They  might  be  relatively  small 
econometric models with differing degrees of 
emphasis on economic theory.  Or the models 
might be informal, reflecting expert judgment and 
experience, but not necessarily lending themselves 
to expression as a set of econometric equations. 
Alternatively, an average of forecasts from many 
models might be used in determining future pros- 
pects for nominal GNP. 
The most  important quality of  the model or 
models,  however,  is  that  they  provide  useful 
forecasts of nominal GNP growth. Although the 
model need not precisely predict nominal GNP, 
it should, over long time spans, correctly predict 
nominal GNP's  average growth rate.  Because 
forecasts would be revised frequently-as often 
as policymakers met to consider short-run policy 
options-new information would be incorporated 
into forecasts as it became available. While fore- 
cast  errors  will  doubtlessly  be  made,  policy- 
makers cannot, under any monetary policy that 
attempts to offset economic disturbances, escape 
the policy transmission lag. Thus, forecasts will 
have to be made. Success or failure of any policy 
will inevitably depend in part on policymakers' 
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Given the inevitable need for forecasts, how 
might forecasts be used in determining short-run 
monetary policy under a nominal GNP target? 
Each period, policymakers would forecast future 
nominal GNP growth based on the current set- 
ting of  policy  instruments. These instruments 
might include some combination of the federal 
funds rate, the discount rate, the monetary base, 
or bank reserves. If  the forecast indicated that 
nominal GNP was likely to exceed target in the 
future, policymakers would immediately adjust 
instruments to tighten monetary policy. If, on the 
other hand, the forecast indicated that nominal 
GNP was likely to fall below target, policymakers 
would immediately adjust instruments to loosen 
policy. 
Implicit in this procedure is a reliable relation- 
ship between nominal  GNP and  policy  instru- 
ments. Policymakers would need to know that by 
adjusting instruments by a given amount, nominal 
GNP would be changed in a predictable fashion. 
Again, an economic model would be useful, and 
some experience required, before policymakers 
could pin down a reliable relationship between 
instruments and nominal GNP. 
As  an  example of  how  policymakers might 
adjust monetary policy in response to an economic 
disturbance, consider the effect of the recent stock 
market collapse. Before October, major economic 
forecasters did not anticipate a stock market col- 
lapse and, as a result, did not incorporate a sharp 
fall  in  stock  prices into forecasts for  nominal 
GNP. Therefore, monetary policy would not have 
anticipated the collapse. However, after the col- 
lapse occurred,  economic forecasters adjusted 
downward  their  forecasts  of  nominal  GNP 
growth. Had monetary policy been operated under 
a nominal GNP target, these forecasts would have 
led policymakers to ease policy. After the col- 
lapse,  as  new  information  indicated  that  the 
economy remained strong, forecasters raised their 
estimates of  nominal GNP growth. Along with 
these revised forecasts, policymakers would have 
tightened monetary policy. As  a result, policy 
under a nominal GNP target would probably not 
have differed substantially from its actual course. 
Potential problems with the 
short-run policy procedure 
Just as there are potential problems in set- 
ting long-run targets for nominal GNP, there are 
also  potential  problems  with  the  procedure 
described for dealing with short-run economic 
disturbances. The two main potential problems 
are the symmetric treatment of price and output 
fluctuations under supply shocks and the emphasis 
placed on economic forecasts. 
With nominal GNP targets, prices and output 
are viewed symmetrically. An increase in real out- 
put is acceptable only if it is offset by an equal 
decrease in the price level. But policymakers or 
the  public  may  have  other  preferences.  For 
example, they may regard output stability as more 
important than price level stability. If  so, they 
might be willing to tolerate a substantial increase 
in prices to moderate the real output effect of an 
adverse supply disturbance. Given these prefer- 
ences, sticking to a nominal GNP target would 
lead to excessive output volatility.I7 
l6 For an analysis of the use of forecasts in monetary policy, 
see John  Judd, "Looking Forward," FRBSF  Weekly  Letter, 
Federal Reserve Bank  of San  Francisco, July 8, 1988. 
If the publlc views output stability as more important than 
price stability and supply shocks predominate demand shocks, 
an  alternative  monetary  policy  procedure,  such  as  money 
targeting, might work better than nominal GNP targeting. For 
example, if aggregate demand is relatively price insensitive, the 
impact of supply disturbances on real output is less severe with 
a  money  target  than  with  a  nominal  GNP  target.  See,  for 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Furthermore, the implementation of a nominal 
GNP target places great emphasis on  forecast^.'^ 
But the economic models on which forecasts are 
based may be unreliable. Even if the models have 
forecast well in the past, there is no guarantee 
that they  will continue to forecast well in  the 
future. Furthermore,  most economic models- 
formal or informal-are notoriously bad at pre- 
dicting recessions and recoveries. Predicting such 
turning points in the business cycle, however; is 
crucial  in  implementing  any  countercyclical 
policy, including a  policy  with  nominal GNP 
targets  or  a  policy  with  monetary  aggregate 
targets.  To keep nominal GNP on  target,  for 
example, policy would likely need to be adjusted 
well in advance of any predicted turning point. 
If turning points are not predicted, actions will 
not be taken to moderate cyclical fluctuations. 
Given the need for nominal GNP forecasts, how 
should these forecasts be made? As a practical 
matter, monetary policy is made by a committee- 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). 
Therefore, each committee member would need 
to forecast nominal GNP. Because each commit- 
tee member could use a different model or set 
of models in forecasting nominal GNP, a range 
of forecasts could result. For example, the range 
of forecasts that the Federal Reserve reports each 
February  from  the FOMC  and  other  Federal 
example, John Taylor, "What Would Nominal GNP Targeting 
Do to the Business Cycle?" in Karl Bmnner and Allan Meltzer, 
eds., Understanding  Monetary  Regimes. Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference on  Public  Policy,  Vol. 22,  Amsterdam:  North- 
Holland, 1985,  pp. 65-67. 
To  resolve  this  potential  problem  with  nominal  GNP,  a 
weighted average of the price level and output could be used 
as the  target of monetary policy, with  the weights reflecting 
society's preferences. However, such an approach would require 
separate price and output forecasts and defeat one advantage of 
nominal GNP targets. 
18 See Axilrod, "Comments," pp. 123-26, and McNees, "Pro- 
spective Nominal GNP Targeting," pp. 3-9. 
Reserve Bank presidents is typically two or more 
percentage points wide. On whose forecast would 
policymakers base short-run policy adjustments? 
Either a consensus would  have to be reached 
among committee members or the forecasts would 
have to be averaged. 
In summary, there are potential problems with 
using  nominal GNP as  a  guide for  short-run 
monetary  policy.  Economists  differ  on  the 
importance of these problems. Those economists 
who have confidence in  economic models and 
their forecasting ability and who believe that price 
and output stability are equally important might 
downplay the objections. On the other hand, those 
who consider economic models unreliable and 
who value output stability  more (or less) than 
price  stability  might  find  the  entire  concept 
troublesome. 
Empirical evidence on the usefulness 
of  nominal GNP targeting 
As emphasized in the last section, policymakers 
must be able to forecast and control nominal GNP 
if nominal GNP targets are to be implemented. 
Furthermore,  the desirability of  nominal GNP 
targets as a guide for monetary policy depends 
on their potential for improving the performance 
of  the economy. This section  briefly  reviews 
evidence on three empirical issues-the forecast- 
ability of  nominal GNP, the controllability of 
nominal GNP, and the hypothetical performance 
of  the economy under a  nominal GNP target. 
Evidence on these issues is crucial in determin- 
ing  the  viability  of  nominal  GNP  targeting. 
Because the evidence on these issues is mixed, 
the viability of nominal GNP targeting remains 
an open question. 
Forecastability of  nominal GNP 
If policymakers are to use nominal GNP in the 
conduct of  monetary policy, they need reliable 
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in  advance.  Are  reliable  forecasts available? 
Although the record of forecasters in the 1970s 
and  1980s  has  not  been  particularly  good, 
forecasts of nominal GNP have been good enough 
to predict several important cyclical turning points 
in  the economy. 
Because the business of economic forecasting 
is widespread, there are too many forecasts to 
analyze each one in detail. Rather, two composite 
forecasts are examined. One is the composite 
compiled  by  Stephen  McNees  of  the Federal 
Reserve Bank of  Boston; the other is the Blue 
Chip composite compiled by  Robert Eggert.19 
These two composites are examined because they 
incorporate different sets of forecasts, different 
forecast horizons, and different sample periods. 
While the McNees composite includes primar- 
ily the forecasts from a few large econometric 
models, the Blue Chip composite includes, in 
addition to formal forecasts from econometric 
models, the informal forecasts of many business 
economists. While FOMC members would cer- 
tainly look closely at these private forecasts, they 
would not be bound to adopt such forecasts as 
their own. These composite forecasts are used 
only  as proxies for  the forecasts that  FOMC 
members might make. 
The McNees composite forecasts-available 
from 197  1 to 1985-are plotted in Chart 1. These 
one-year-ahead median quarterly forecasts come 
from five leading forecasting organizations. In 
comparing actual nominal GNP growth to the 
composite forecast,  it  is clear that forecasters 
made  large  errors.  In  particular,  forecasters 
19 Stephen McNees, "Which Forecast Should You Use?"  New 
England Economic Review, JulyIAugust 1985, pp. 36-42, and 
Robert Eggert, Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Sedona, Arizona: 
Eggen Economic Enterprises, Inc.,  various issues. 
underpredicted nominal GNP growth in the early 
and  late 1970s and  substantially overpredicted 
nominal GNP growth in 1982-83. However, over 
the  entire  sample,  positive  prediction  errors 
tended  to  offset  negative  prediction  errors.20 
Therefore, had these forecasts actually been used 
for short-run policy adjustment, there would have 
been no tendency for nominal GNP to persistently 
exceed or fall below target. 
How  important were the forecast errors for 
nominal GNP? If monetary policy had been based 
on  nominal GNP growth forecasts during this 
period, a recession would not have been predicted 
for 198 1-82.One-year-ahead forecasts for nomi- 
nal GNP growth in late 1981 and early 1982 were 
relatively high and stable, while actual nominal 
GNP growth fell from over 12 percent to less than 
5 percent. As a result, monetary policy would 
not  have  eased  soon  enough  to  prevent  the 
downturn.  However,  because  growth  targets 
would  not  have  been  revised  downward  in 
response  to  the  cyclical downturn,  monetary 
policy would have been eased as forecasts of 
nominal GNP growth were revised downward to 
reflect unexpectedly weak performance. Further- 
more, despite this one glaring forecast failure, 
nominal GNP forecasts correctly anticipated the 
direction,  if  not  the  magnitude,  of  cyclical 
20 This was not true of forecasts for inflation and real output 
growth.  Over the same period, forecasts for the inflation rate 
and real output growth (not shown) contained prediction errors 
of roughly the same magnitude as nominal GNP errors, but these 
errors did not average out over time. A tendency to underpredict 
inflation offset a tendency to overpredict real output growth. 
Thus, the argument that economists understand the determinants 
of  nominal GNP better  than they  understand  the division of 
nominal GNP between prices and output may have some merit. 
More recent evidence compiled by McNees, however, indicates 
that while forecasts of inflation and real growth have improved 
somewhat over time, forecasts for nominal GNP have not. See 
McNees, "How  Accurate  Are  Economic  Forecasts?" New 
England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
JulyIAugust 1988, pp. 15-36. 
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McNees composite forecast of nominal GNP growth and actual nominal GNP growth 
Source: Department of Commerce and Stephen McNees, "Which Forecast Should You Use?"  New England Economic Review. 
July/August 1985. 
changes in most other instances. For example, 
forecasts indicated a need to tighten in 1972-73 
as inflation was accelerating and to ease in 1974 
and 1981 as the economy faltered.21 
A  slightly  better  picture  of  the  quality  of 
nominal GNP forecasts emerges from the Blue 
Chip consensus. Chart 2 plots the mean forecasts 
from  this  larger  group of  private forecasters. 
Unlike the McNees survey, the Blue Chip con- 
sensus does not rely primarily on forecasts from 
large econometric models. Furthermore,  Blue 
Chip  forecasts  for  quarterly  growth  rates  of 
nominal GNP are available monthly from 1980 
21 See  also  Robert  Gordon,  Macroeconomics, 4th  edition, 
Boston: Little, Brown and  Company,  1987, pp. 442-43. 
and  therefore  provide forecasts  reaching  into 
1989. Each point on the chart represents a forecast 
of  the four-quarter nominal GNP growth rate 
made six months earlier. For example, the obser- 
vation for the third quarter of any given year is 
the forecast made in March for the four-quarter 
growth rate of  nominal GNP beginning in the 
third quarter of the previous year and ending four 
quarters later. 
Because the forecast horizon is shorter than in 
the McNees sample-six months instead of one 
year-it  is not surprising that the forecasts are 
better. Using this sample of forecasters with a 
six-month-ahead horizon indicates that forecast- 
ers did a better job at predicting the 1982 reces- 
sion. Furthermore, for the decade of the 1980s, 
the errors from the Blue Chip six-month-ahead 
forecast were relatively small. However, it is not 
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Blue Chip composite forecast of nominal GNP growth and actual nominal GNP growth 
Source:  Department of Commerce and  Robert Eggert, Blue Chip Economic Indicators,  various  Issues. 
sufficient  that  forecasts  errors  be  small  for 
nominal GNP targeting to be useful. In addition 
to being able to forecast nominal GNP reasonably 
well, policymakers must be able to exert control 
over nominal GNP. 
Controllability of  nominal GNP 
While policymakers cannot control  nominal 
GNP in the very short run, they do exert some 
influence over nominal GNP over longer hori- 
zons. This lack of control in the very short run 
is simply another reflection of the policy transmis- 
sion lag. It also underscores the need for forecasts 
in implementing policy. 
Evidence on the' controllability  issue comes 
from estimated relationships between  nominal 
GNP  and  policy  instruments.  Two  possible 
instruments of monetary  policy are the federal 
funds rate and the monetary base. Lagged values 
of each of these instrument variables explain a 
statistically  significant  proportion  of  nominal 
GNP  Although the federal funds rate 
has more explanatory power than the monetary 
base, in a statistical sense, past,values of both the 
monetary  base and the federal funds rate help 
explain subsequent fluctuations in nominal GNP 
growth. Thus, policymakers could conceivably 
22 In bivariate Granger causality tests, the hypothesis that the 
federal funds rate does not cause nominal GNP can be rejected 
at a 0.001 significance  level, and the hypothesis that the monetary 
base does not cause  nominal GNP can be  rejected at a 0.074 
significance level. The sample period for the test is 1960:Q2 to 
1988:Q1, and four lagged values of nominal GNP and the rele- 
vant instrument variable are included on the right-hand side. All 
variables are expressed  in quarterly  growth  rates. 
32  Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City use these instruments to influence the course of 
nominal GNP. 
Based on this evidence, however, it is highly 
doubtful that policymakers could precisely con- 
trol nominal GNP. Precise control would require 
that policymakers offset all factors that tend to 
take nominal GNP away from target. Many of 
these  factors,  however,  would  be difficult  to 
predict. Furthermore, the relationship between 
policy  instruments  and  nominal  GNP,  while 
statistically significant, is not necessarily econom- 
ically strong. In other words, it may take rela- 
tively large movements in policy instruments to 
make  relatively small adjustments in nominal 
GNP. 
Further  evidence  comes  from  simulation 
studies. For example, one study simulates a model 
in which the monetary base is determined by a 
simple formula or rule.23  This rule represents the 
hypothetical  behavior of policymakers under a 
nominal GNP target. The rule requires policy- 
makers to make specific adjustments to the base 
in response to departures of nominal GNP from 
target. When the economy is simulated with this 
rule in place, the rule is found  to keep actual 
nominal GNP close to its target. Furthermore, 
the rule keeps nominal GNP closer to target than 
alternative rules such as a constant growth rate 
for the base. And when the performance of the 
rule is compared to actual monetary policy from 
1954 to 1985, the rule yields less variability  in 
nominal GNP. Therefore, according to this study, 
policymakers can keep nominal  GNP growing 
smoothly at a noninflationary  rate by adjusting 
the monetary  base. 
Hypothetical performance 
under a nominal GNP target 
Determining  how  the economy  would  have 
23 Bennett McCallum, "The Case for Rules . . . ," pp. 415-29. 
operated under a monetary policy with nominal 
GNP targets is a difficult task. The best that can 
be done without resorting to complicated econo- 
metrics is to give an idea of how monetary policy 
might have differed had targets for nominal GNP 
been in use. Because such targets were not in use, 
a first step in the analysis is to determine targets 
for nominal GNP that might have been consis- 
tent  with  policymakers'  historical goals under 
actual policy procedures. Forecasts for nominal 
GNP can  then be compared  with  hypothetical 
targets to determine if and when policy was too 
tight or too easy. 
Hypothetical targets for nominal  GNP were 
selected by looking at historical economic pro- 
jections  made by  members of  the  FOMC and 
other Federal Reserve Bank presidents. Each year 
in  February,  the  Federal  Reserve  reports  on 
monetary policy objectives. Since 1980, FOMC 
members and other Reserve Bank presidents have 
provided their estimate of a nominal GNP growth 
rate range that is consistent with monetary policy 
objectives. These ranges, which in the last sec- 
tion were used as an indication of differences in 
policymakers' nominal GNP growth forecasts, in 
this section are used as hypothetical nominal GNP 
targets. Although the ranges have in no sense been 
used as targets for monetary policy, they do repre- 
sent a broad indication of the kind of nominal 
GNP performance that would be consistent with 
stated monetary  policy goals. It should also be 
noted that projected nominal GNP growth reflects 
not only the Federal Reserve's monetary policy 
objectives but also its assessment of other pro- 
spective influences on the economy.  24 
24 Even as a hypothetical target, the historically projected ranges 
for nominal GNP growth have several flaws. First, the ranges 
are probably  too w~de  to serve as effective targets. They are 
typically  over  two  percentage  points  wide,  allowing  for  a 
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*Ranges and forecasts for 1989 were determined  in July 1988. 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Monetary Policy Objectives," various issues and Robert Eggert, 
Blue Chip Economic Indicarors, various issues. 
The Blue Chip consensus forecast of  nominal 
GNP growth (from Chart 2) is compared with 
FOMC projected ranges in Chart 3. The Blue 
Chip consensus is used once again as a proxy for 
forecasts that might have been generated at policy 
considerable range of economic outcomes. Nevertheless, because 
of uncertainty about what nominal GNP growth rates might have 
been consistent with long-run FOMC objectives, a relatively w~de 
range is required. Second, the ranges represent one-year targets 
rather than multiyear targets. Because the ranges are estimated 
from  the actual  level of nom~nal  GNP in  the previous fourth 
quarter to the predicted level for the current fourth quarter, they 
are rebased every year. Thus, if  nominal GNP ended the year 
above target,  there would be no requirement that, in the next 
year,  it  be brought  back down. Finally,  projected ranges for 
nominal GNP growth incorporate a long-term strategy for achiev- 
ing monetary goals only to the extent they reflect the FOMC's 
long-term strategy  for other variables. 
meetings. It is used rather than the McNees com- 
posite because it contains more recent forecasts 
and  therefore overlaps more of  the period for 
which hypothetical ranges are available. Reflect- 
ing the disinflation of the 1980s, both the forecast 
growth rates and projected growth ranges declined 
over time. For most of the period, nominal GNP 
growth forecasts fell  within their hypothetical 
target ranges. In particular, from 1985 to the end 
of  the  sample,  forecasts did  not  significantly 
diverge from target. Thus, during this period, 
monetary policy would not have differed substan- 
tially from historical policy, given the hypothet- 
ical  ranges. 
During  the  period  before  1985,  however, 
monetary policy might have been somewhat dif- 
ferent. In particular, in late 1980 and throughout 
most of 1982, nominal GNP forecasts fell below 
34  Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City the FOMC's projected ranges, perhaps indicating 
a need for an easier monetary policy than actually 
occurred. An easier monetary policy carried out 
in advance of these periods might have led to less 
severe drops in real GNP than actually occurred. 
Furthermore,  nominal  GNP forecasts made in 
early  1981 for six  months later  exceeded  the 
FOMC's projected ranges, indicating a need for 
a tighter monetary policy.  A tighter monetary 
policy in this period might have reduced the build- 
up of inflationary pressure and reduced the need 
for more drastic tightening later. Thus, had nomi- 
nal GNP targeting been  used during the early 
1980s, the recessions of 1980 and 198  1-82 might 
have been less severe. 
This kind of evidence, however, is imprecise. 
When fundamental changes in policy occur, the 
behavior of the economy may also change funda- 
mentally.25 Thus,  predictions  from  empirical 
models based on one policy regime may not hold 
under a different regime. Because of this funda- 
mental problem, empirical evidence on the per- 
formance of the economy under a monetary policy 
based on nominal GNP targets can only be sug- 
gestive. 
Despite its inevitable imprecision, however, the 
evidence suggests that nominal GNP targets might 
contribute to favorable economic performance. 
In periods of relatively stable nominal demand 
growth, such as has occurred since 1985, nominal 
25 This proposition is known as the Lucas Critique. See Robert 
Lucas, "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in Karl 
Bmnner and  Allan Meltzer, eds., 7he Phillips Curve and the 
Labor Markers, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on Public 
Policy, Vol.  1, Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1976, pp.  19-46. 
GNP targets may make little difference.  How- 
ever, in periods of sharp economic fluctuations, 
nominal GNP targets might make policy respond 
faster and reduce the severity of business cycles. 
Conclusions 
Nominal GNP has some theoretical appeal as 
a  target of  monetary  policy.  A  nominal  GNP 
target provides monetary  policy  an anchor by 
holding policymakers to the goal of long-run price 
stability.  It  provides some slack,  however, to 
allow policymakers to reduce the adverse con- 
sequences of short-run economic disturbances. 
Demand shocks are completely  offset, and the 
impact  of  supply  shocks  is  divided  equally 
between  price effects and  output effects.  The 
desirability of a nominal GNP target in the face 
of supply shocks, therefore, depends on society 
placing the same value on price stability that it 
places on output stability. 
Whether policymakers can translate this theo- 
retical appeal into an actual policy that improves 
economic performance is an open question. Any 
such policy would require explicit nominal GNP 
forecasts and a long-run strategy for dealing with 
inflation. In the past, forecasts for nominal GNP 
have sometimes widely missed the mark. In the 
future, forecasts may not improve. Policymakers, 
therefore, may resist adopting a policy procedure 
that depends so explicitly and openly on fallible 
forecasts.  Furthermore,  policymakers  may  be 
reluctant to commit to any long-run strategy that 
could tie their hands in the face of unusual cir- 
cumstances. Despite these problems, some evi- 
dence does suggest  that  nominal  GNP targets 
could be useful tools to help policymakers achieve 
their goals. 
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